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BETWEEN  October  1978 and March 1979, the money stock measured 
by M] fell at a 1.7 percent  annual  rate,  while  measured  by M2  it rose at a 
2.4 percent annual rate (continuously  compounded). These rates are 
sharply  below those of the previous  three years.  In the thirty-six  month 
period  ending  October  1978, M1  rose at an average  annual  rate  of 6.9 per- 
cent, while M2 rose at a 9.4 percent rate. The deceleration  of money 
growth  since October  is one of the sharpest  in the postwar  period. The 
purpose  of this  paper  is to discuss  the significance  of this deceleration. 
Before discussing  the major  issues,  I want  to dispose  of a possible,  but 
I believe  incorrect,  interpretation  of the  monetary  deceleration-the inter- 
pretation  suggests  that the sharp  deceleration  is part of a strategy  of the 
administration  and  Federal  Reserve  to produce  an early  and sharp  reces- 
sion in order to reduce inflation quickly. Although the policymakers 
clearly  do want to slow the economy,  a deliberate,  sharp  recession  is in- 
consistent  with both stated  policy and fiscal  policy actions,  which I con- 
sider  to reflect  only a mildly  restrictive  policy  stance. 
Accuracy of Monetary Statistics 
If reported  rates  of money  growth  are  taken  at face  value,  and  especially 
if their  deceleration  continues  for another  few months,  long experience  in- 
dicates  that the economy  will fall into a deep recession.  However,  many 
observers,  both inside  and outside  the government,  believe  that  monetary 
policy is not nearly  as restrictive  as the published  rates  of money  growth 
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suggest.  Clearly,  if M2  is in fact growing  at 8 percent  rather  than  at 3 per- 
cent, our view of the extent of current  monetary  restriction  must  be re- 
vised. A variety  of reasons  have been offered  to explain  why the current 
monetary  statistics  are subject  to serious  measurement  error. 
After examining  the various  problems  with the monetary  statistics,  I 
am not convinced  that there  is a good reason  to distrust  the basic story 
being  told by the published  numbers.  And my  reading  of the Porter,  Simp- 
son, and  Mauskopf  paper  in this issue has reinforced  this view. With re- 
spect  to M1,  one measurement  problem  is that raised  by the introduction 
last November  of the automatic  transfer  service (ATS), which permits 
funds  to be transferred  from  savings  accounts  to demand  accounts  to cover 
a check  that  would  otherwise  bounce.  The effect  of this  regulatory  change 
is to make savings accounts  that are subject  to the automatic  transfer 
agreement  equivalent  to interest-bearing  demand  deposits.  The Federal 
Reserve  has been monitoring  the amount  of funds in ATS accounts;  the 
evidence  suggests  that including  all these accounts  in M] would raise its 
rate of growth  by 2 to 3 percentage  points. Thus, because  published  M1 
has been falling at a 1.7 percent  annual  rate, M] corrected  for ATS ac- 
counts  is rising  at about  a 1 percent  annual  rate, which is still a marked 
deceleration  from earlier  rates  of growth.  In addition,  the advent  of ATS 
accounts  does not affect  the M2  numbers,  and  M2  has decelerated  sharply. 
Interpretation  of the money numbers  is also clouded by the rapid 
growth  of money-market  mutual  funds and of security  repurchase  agree- 
ments at banks-arrangements  whereby  bank depositors  can withdraw 
funds  from  deposits  and  place  them  temporarily  in interest-bearing  securi- 
ties.  However,  the growth  of money  substitutes  did  not suddenly  accelerate 
in November;  to the extent  that  there  is a measurement  problem,  it affects 
the data before as well as after  November.  Even if money-market  funds 
and  security  repurchase  agreements  were  added  to M2  as currently  defined, 
the resulting  series  would  not change  the observation  that  there  has  been a 
sharp  monetary  deceleration  since  November. 
It is also important  to understand  that mismeasurement  issues are 
necessarily  linked  with  interest  elasticity  issues.  Monetary  aggregates  con- 
ventionally  defined  have an interest  elasticity  of demand  arising  precisely 
from the substitution  of nonmonetary  for monetary  assets at times  when 
interest  rates are high. If current  behavior  is more or less comparable  to 
behavior  in the past, then  the rapid  growth  of money  substitutes  is already 
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It is, of course,  claimed  that  standard  money-demand  functions  are  now 
far off track.  But this judgment  depends  on two assumptions:  oneis that 
estimates  of the current  level of GNP will not be revised  downward  sub- 
stantially;  the other is that the standard  money-demand  functions  cor- 
rectly  represent  the lag structure  of money demand.  The same argument 
was heard  in 1974, and yet in retrospect  it is obvious  that  preventing  the 
monetary  deceleration  of late 1974 would have served  to moderate  the 
severity  of the cyclical  contraction  then  under  way.  At a minimum,  policy- 
makers  should recognize  that the slow money growth  in recent moniths 
may  reflect  a softening  of the economy-either today  or in the future. 
Doubts  about  the current  monetary  deceleration  are  not all on one side. 
It could be argued  that the deceleration  is in fact much deeper  than the 
current  numbers  indicate.  For example,  the growth  of time deposits  in 
certificate  form  might  be regarded  as making  a large  part  of M2  less liquid 
than  it was previously.  The M,+ measure  of the money  stock,  which  con- 
sists of MI plus savings  accounts  in commercial  banks  and thrift  institu- 
tions and excludes time deposits in certificate  form, has been falling 
rapidly-at  a 4.8 percent  annual  rate of decline from October 1978 to 
March  1979. In addition,  some  observers  place  great  emphasis  on the  real 
money stock; with the recent acceleration  in inflation,  that measure  is 
obviously  falling  rapidly. 
I conclude that a substantial  monetary  deceleration  is occurring.  Of 
course,  new evidence  could  show  that  the extent  of the  monetary  decelera- 
tion has been overestimated  or underestimated;  but it is always  true  that 
additional  data may change  the picture.  Because of the uncertainties,  I 
would  be only surprised  rather  than shocked  if subsequent  investigation 
demonstrated  the need  for large  revisions. 
The policy implication  of the increasin-g  doubt  about  the reliability  of 
the  monetary  statistics-provided the numbers  are  not regarded  as totally 
worthless-is that less weight  should  be placed on monetary  aggregates 
and more on other variables  such as interest  rates. Once the monetary 
deceleration  had lasted long enough that it could not be dismissed  as a 
temporary  aberration-in early  January,  say-policy  should  have shifted 
both to a lower  money  growth  target  and to lower interest  rates.  In fact, 
the Federal  Reserve  has maintained  its target  for the federal  funds rate 
and permitted  all the uncertainty  to appear  in slow money growth.  This 
policy is optimal  only under  the extreme  assumption  that the monetary 
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Probable  Effects  of the Monetary  Deceleration 
My reading  of incoming  economic  data  is that  they are  fully consistent 
with the known lags in monetary  processes.  The sharp deceleration  of 
money growth  beginning  in November  should  be expected  to produce  a 
downturn  in the economy  after  a lag of six to twelve  months.  Thus a busi- 
ness cycle peak should  occur  between  May and  November  of 1979. Such 
an outcome  is fully consistent  with  what  is already  known  about  the econ- 
omy. For example, the rate of growth of industrial  production  slowed 
from December 1978 to March  1979; according  to the preliminaly  esti- 
mates,  real GNP in the first  quarter  of 1979 rose at an annual  rate  of only 
0.7 percent;  housing  starts  declined;  and new orders  for durable  goods, 
with the exception  of aircraft  orders,  were  weak.  Employment  was strong 
through  March,  but  it typically  lags  behind  other  business  cycle  indicators 
by a few months.  The one important  piece of information  that does not 
actually  fit the recession  scenario  is the performance  of the stock  market 
thus  far in 1979; the stock  market  almost  always  turns  down  at or before 
the business  cycle peak and  has not done so yet. 
In short,  I believe  that  the sharp  monetary  deceleration  will produce  a 
recession  and that,  when  the experience  is viewed  in retrospect,  the stan- 
dard recession pattern  will emerge in which monetary  deceleration  is 
linked to declining  output  and rising  unemployment.  I believe the fairly 
typical  inflation  pattern  will also  emerge  in which  the  inflation  rate  remains 
practically  unchanged  through  most  of the recession,  but  begins  to decline 
toward  the end of it or in the early  part  of the next  recovery. 
The interesting  question  is not about  this economic  forecast,  which  in 
basic outline  is widely shared  by private  forecasters  although  not neces- 
sarily  for the same  reasons;  rather,  it is why the Federal  Reserve  and  the 
administration  are so willing to permit  extremely  low money growth  in 
the face of the available  evidence. 
Why  the Monetary  Deceleration  Has Occurred 
The best shorthand  description  of day-by-day  Federal  Reserve  policy 
is that  it consists  of an adjustable  peg on the interest  rate  on federa-l  funds. 
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enormous  scale of open market  operations  required  to hold the rate in a 
narrow  band. In 1978 the net change  in the monetary  authority's  open 
market  account  was $7.0 billion, but over the course of the year gross 
purchases  of securities  amounted  to about  $728 billion and  gross  sales to 
about $721 billion. With the federal  funds rate tightly  controlled  in the 
short  run, quantities  of bank  reserves  and money are determined  by pri- 
vate demands. 
To understand  the significance  of this  mode of operation,  consider  two 
different  ways  in which  the Federal  Reserve  might  operate  in pursuing  its 
underlying  objectives.  On the one hand, it could control  bank reserves, 
permitting  interest  rates  to fluctuate  relatively  freely  in the short  run,  but 
temper  the reserve  targets  to realize  a trade-off  between  interest  rate  tar- 
gets and  money  stock  targets  over  a period  of several  months.  On  the  other 
hand, the Federal  Reserve could control  interest  rates on a day-by-day 
basis-as  it has for many years-but  permit  some interest  rate fluctua- 
tions to produce a desired trade-off  between interest  rates and money 
stock paths over a span of several  months.  In principle,  on the basis of 
monthly, or certainly  quarterly,  averages,  the two different  day-by-day 
control  strategies  could  lead to essentially  identical  paths  for interest  rates 
and  the money  stock. 
If identical interest rate and money stock paths could be obtained 
through  tight  daily  control  of either  interest  rates  or bank  reserves,  then  it 
is useful  to ask  whether  it makes  any  difference  which  instrument  the cen- 
tral  bank  in fact controls.  I am convinced  that  the choice of control  vari- 
able does make an important  difference  in monetary  policy because 
policymakers  necessarily  operate in an environment  subject to broad 
societal and political  pressures. 
Those pressures  seem to operate  on a very crude  information  base. In 
recent  months  the objective  function  emphasized  in the political  process 
has placed great  weight  on the goal of less inflation.  The general  public 
believes  that  policy should  be maintained  in a restrictive  stance,  or an in- 
creasingly  restrictive  stance,  until progress  is made  in reducing  inflation. 
Because  the Federal  Reserve  is controlling  interest  rates,  such  a stance  by 
definition  involves higher interest rates. However, the implications  of 
higher  interest  rates  for money  growth  are  largely  ignored  in public  debate 
over  monetary  policy. 
If the Federal  Reserve  had  been controlling  the money  stock  instead  of 
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called  for a slower  rate of money growth  beginning  in November.  If the 
Federal  Reserve  had been controlling  the money  stock,  it could  have fol- 
lowed a policy responsive  to the political  pressures  by, say, cutting  M2 
growth  in half-surely  a policy  that  would  have  met  the  public's  definition 
of a more  restrictive  policy. Yet under  that  approach  the Federal  Reserve 
would  have achieved  growth  of M2  of about  5 percent,  rather  than  the 2.4 
percent  actually  realized  over the period since October. 
Clearly,  in responding  to political  pressures  that simply  cannot  be ig- 
nored,  it makes  an enormous  difference  whether  the day-by-day  monetary 
policy target  is an interest  rate  or a monetary  aggregate.  With  the money 
stock determined  by demand  under an interest  rate peg, no one could 
accurately  predict  how money  g.rowth  would  be affected  by the November 
increase  in the federal  funds  rate.  However,  even after  observing  the very 
low money  growth  that  followed,  political  pressures  to maintain  a restric- 
tive policy made  it difficult  for the Federal  Reserve  to consider  reducing 
the funds  rate  in order  to obtain  money  growth  somewhat  faster  than 2.4 
percent  on M2 
The political  problem  facing  the policymakers  will become  even more 
painful  if I am correct  in my  reading  of current  economic  data  and  if addi- 
tional data confirms  this view among  business  cycle experts.  Even when 
the Federal  Reserve  decides  the time  has come for higher  money  growth, 
it will find  itself in a very difficult  public  relations  position  because  reduc- 
ing the federal  funds  rate  to obtain  higher  money  growth  could  be widely 
interpreted  as a premature  policy  reversal. 
Federal  Reserve  policy,  then,  must  be understood  as reflecting  an  inter- 
play between  the judgments  of the economists  and others  within  the Fed- 
eral Reserve System  and broad political pressures  reflecting  the prefer- 
ences, anxieties,  and fears of the general  public. Today these factors  are 
interacting  to produce  a response  pattern  that involves maintaining  un- 
changed  interest  rate  targets-and possibly  even raising  them-until  it is 
obvious  that  lower  interest  rates  are  needed.  That  time  will not arrive  until 
it is evident  to both the monetary  authority  and the general  public  that a 
recession  is upon us. 
Lessons  to Be Learned 
The  monetary  policy  response  pattern  sketched  above  is clearly  inferior 
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response  pattern  were programmed  into any of the major  macroecono- 
metric  models, I am confident  that the resulting  instability  would  be far 
greater  than what  would be obtained  in these  models  by a rule  providing 
for steady  money  growth. 
Since 1975 the Federal  Reserve  has declared  targets  for money  growth. 
The targets  announced  on February  20, 1979, were  for 1.5 to 4.5 percent 
growth  for M1 and 5 to 8 percent  growth  for M2.  Given  that the Federal 
Reserve  has been holding  the federal  funds  rate at about 10 percent  even 
though  money growth  has been below declared  targets  for many  months, 
it is simply  ignoring  its own monetary  targets.  Perhaps  the monetary  tar- 
gets should be regarded  as an empty ritual, but such rituals  have their 
costs. Public officials  should  not make announcements  about what they 
intend  to do and then routinely  ignore  them because  it is important  that 
their serious announcements  be believed. The Federal Reserve should 
either  hit its announced  targets  or announce  forthrightly  that  these  targets 
are not targets  at all but only vague expectations  that have little bearing 
on actual  policy. 
The problems  raised  for discretionary  policymakers  by the absence  of 
a well-defined  response  rule are nicely illustrated  by recent events. Be- 
cause interest  rates follow a pro-cyclical  pattern,  declines in rates may 
reasonably  be interpreted  as a sign  that  the economy  may  be cooling,  and 
vice versa. However,  it is also true that over short periods  interest  rate 
changes  may reflect  substantial  speculative  activity,  including  that based 
on forecasts  of what  the Federal  Reserve  will do. 
In the several  weeks  preceding  April 17, interest  rates  on treasury  bills 
rose substantially,  reaching  the 9.60 to 9.70 percent  range  in the week  of 
April  9. If this  increase  was  the  result  of an economy  that  is strengthening, 
continued  tight policy may be warranted.  On the other hand, if the in- 
creases  in interest  rates  stemmed  solely from speculation  that the mone- 
tary  authority  would  be following  a tighter  policy-speculation fueled  by 
recent reports that some administration  officials were pressuring  the 
authority  to follow a tighter  policy-the interpretation  of the  rate  increases 
is entirely  different.  Indeed,  treasury  bill rates  dropped  to the 9.10 to 9.20 
range  by early in the week of April 23 in response  to the statement  on 
April 16 by G. William  Miller,  Chairman  of the Federal  Reserve,  which 
the market  interpreted  to mean  that  the economy  was slowing  and  that  no 
further  credit  tightening  was planned  at this time. Then, when the funds 
rate  was raised  slightly  on April  27, the bill rate  rose again,  to about  9.60 
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In sum, because  political  pressures  on the Federal Reserve are cur- 
rently  asymmetrical  it is politically  easy, and  perhaps  even  politically  im- 
perative,  for it to raise  interest  rates  but difficult  to lower them.  Although 
predicting  money growth  is hazardous,  my best guess is that this asym- 
metrical  situation  will lead to money  growth  on the M2  definition  remain- 
ing  below  5 percent,  on the average,  until  after  the cyclical  contraction  has 
begun. 
The  Federal  Reserve's  initial  moves  to lower  the federal  funds  rate  will 
not occur  until  it is fairly  obvious  that  the recession  is at hand,  and  the ini- 
tial moves will be small and cautious.  The weakening  economy and the 
recognition  that the monetary  authority's  policy is changing  will produce 
sharp  declines  in money-market  interest  rates  other  than  the federal  funds 
rate;  money  growth  will remain  low as the  Federal  Reserve  holds  the  funds 
rate above other  rates.  As the recession  deepens,  it will move the federal 
funds  rate  down  more  aggressively.  At some  point  the  funds  rate  will catch 
up with other  money-market  rates  and  money  growth  will begin  to rise. I 
have  no way of knowing  how long this  process  will take.  But I predict  that 
when we look back a year from now, it will be clear that the sharp  de- 
celeration  of money  growth  that  began  in November  1978 and continued 
into the early  months  of the cyclical  contraction  reflected  a policy  that  was 
unambiguously  inferior  to a policy of adhering  to the Federal  Reserve's 
own announced  money  growth  targets. 
The current  acceleration  in inflation  was caused, or at least exacer- 
bated,  by money  growth  in excess of the monetary  authority's  announced 
targets  in 1976-78. If money growth  below announced  targets  is now 
associated  with recession,  these two observations  will offer further  evi- 
dence that a policy of actually  achieving  monetary  targets  adjusted  grad- 
ually over time promises  better  outcomes  than a policy that  ignores  such 
targets. 
Discussion 
IF  POLICY were as restrictive as Poole  suggested, reasoned David Fand, 
interest rates would have exploded in recent months when nominal GNP 
was rising sharply. Fand concluded that accelerated innovations in finan- 